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Abstract 
 
In this paper we test the weak Porter hypothesis on a sample of European economies in the 
period 1995-2008. We focus on the channels through which tighter environmental regulation 
affects productivity and innovation. Our findings suggest that the “weak” Porter hypothesis 
cannot be rejected and that the choice of policy instruments is not neutral. In particular, 
market based environmental stringency measures seem to be the most suitable to stimulate 
innovation and productivity growth. Consistently with the strategic reorientation of 
environmental policies in the European Union since the end of the eighties, our results 
indicate that the EU might privilege market based instruments in order to meet more 
effectively the 2030 targets, especially through the channels of innovation and productivity 
enhancement. 
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Environmental Policies, Innovation and 
Productivity in the EU 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The conventional perception about environmental protection is that it 
imposes additional costs on firms, which may reduce their global 
competitiveness with negative effects on growth and employment. But, at the 
same time, more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations 
that may over-compensate for the costs of complying with these policies 
(Porter and Van der Linde 1995). This is known as the Porter hypothesis and 
it suggests the existence of a double dividend – environment and competition 
are not incompatible since properly designed environmental regulation can 
stimulate innovation which in turn will increase competitiveness.  
 
The goal of inducing environmental innovation and enhancing productivity is 
a significant challenge to policymakers.1 The European Union has been very 
sensitive and active in the design of environmental and climate regulation 
policies since the beginning of the 1970s. The European Commission can be 
identified as a motivating force in global environmental negotiations that 
strongly supported the achievement of the two United Nations climate 
                                                        1 Pollution is a negative environmental externality, while innovation is a positive externality. Therefore, without a public intervention to manage these two market failures, firms pollute too much and innovate too little compared with the social optimum. As such, investments and thus, 
innovation to develop “green” technology are likely to be below the social optimum because, for them, the two market failures are mutually reinforcing (Jaffe et al. 2005). 
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treaties: the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.  
 
The introduction of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) (Directive 
2003/87/EC)2 and the directives of the 2020 Climate and Energy Package on 
CO2 emission reduction (2009/29/EC, 2009) and renewable energy 
(2009/28/EC, 2009) are two of the most significant EU policy interventions. 
The EU ETS is a relevant commitment to the strategic reorientation of 
environmental policies in the European Union that took place gradually since 
1987, with the introduction of the 4th Environment Action Program. Since 
then, Europe increasingly moved away from command-and-control 
regulation towards the implementation of new market-based instruments.3 
 
In 2007, EU leaders endorsed an integrated approach to climate and energy 
policy and committed to transform Europe into a highly energy-efficient, low 
carbon economy. They made a unilateral commitment that Europe would cut 
its emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 levels by 2020.  
 
Recently, the European Commission approved new headline targets for 2030, 
reducing greenhouse gases emissions by at least 40% compared to the 1990                                                         2 As of 2013, the EU ETS covers more than 11,000 factories, power stations, and other installations with a net heat excess of 20 MW in 31 countries—all 28 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein. The installations regulated by the EU ETS are collectively responsible for close to half of the EU's emissions of CO2 and 40% of its total greenhouse gas emissions. The scheme has been divided into a number of "trading periods". The first ETS trading period lasted three years, from January 2005 to December 2007. The second trading period ran from January 2008 until December 2012, coinciding with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The third trading period began in January 2013 and will span until December 2020. Compared to 2005, when the EU ETS was first implemented, the proposed caps for 2020 represents a 21% reduction of greenhouse gases. 3 Market-based instruments (MBI), such as emissions trading, aim at encouraging firm’s behavior through market signals rather than through explicit directives concerning pollution control levels or methods. Command and control regulations (CCR), instead, set uniform standards for firms, that can be technology or performance based. In general, the mainstream neoclassical literature attributes to MBIs the property of static efficiency, saving information costs, the possibility of a double dividend, self-enforcement and the capability of promoting innovation better than command and control instruments. 
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levels, increasing renewable energy to make up at least 27% of final energy 
consumption and a minimum 27% reduction in energy consumption 
compared to business-as-usual. The current projections for 2030, however, 
indicate that further efforts are required at national and EU level to keep the 
EU on track towards its new 2030 targets, as well as its longer term objectives 
to decarbonize the European energy system and cut EU’s greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050. 
 
This paper investigates the channels through which tighter environmental 
regulation affect productivity and innovation. Our analysis is focused on a 
sample of European economies over the period 1995-2008. We contribute to 
the existing literature which evaluates the impact of environmental regulation 
on innovation and productivity by adopting a cross-country macroeconomic 
perspective. Moreover we distinguish between command and control and 
market based environmental policy instruments to examine whether 
environmental regulation has a differential effect on innovation and 
productivity. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section II provides some stylized facts 
about environmental policy in the European Union, section III describes the 
data set, the empirical model and the estimation strategy, section IV illustrates 
empirical findings. Conclusions follow. 
 
 
II. Survey of recent empirical literature   
Innovation is a core element to guarantee the coexistence of economic growth 
and environmental improvements (e.g. the double dividend). As a 
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consequence, it is extremely relevant to identify sound environmental policy 
designs to foster the development and diffusion of ‘environmental friendly’ 
technologies. 
 
The characteristics of the environmental policy framework can affect the rate 
and direction of innovation in pollution abatement technologies. This 
evidence stimulated a number of empirical studies to evaluate the role of 
environmental policy on technological innovation (Johnstone and Labonne, 
2006).  
 
Different policy measures are likely to have different impacts on innovation. 
There is a large body of literature suggesting that market based instruments 
are more likely to induce innovation than direct forms of regulation.4 
 
However, empirical investigation of the consequences of environmental 
regulation at the macroeconomic level is rather scant, heterogeneous and 
mostly developed in the context of international trade.5 Only few studies 
documented the effect of more stringent environmental regulation on 
productivity and environmental innovation adopting a cross-country 
perspective but the empirical evidence is fairly inconclusive.6 
 
Most of the empirical studies developed so far take a microeconomic 
perspective.7 Empirical findings are typically very context-specific and 
focused on different indicators of efficiency and innovation (e.g. multifactor 
productivity, patent counts or efficiency score). As a consequence, the size 
and the sign of the identified effects are hardly comparable.                                                         4 For a survey see Jaffe et al., 2002; Popp et al., 2009. 5 De Santis (2013). 6 See table A1 in the appendix. 7 See Koźluk and Zipperer, 2014. 
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Further, the evidence about the positive impact of tighter environmental 
regulation on environmental innovation is rather weak (Lanjouw and Mody, 
1996; Popp, 2006; De Vries and Withagen, 2005). But, the ‘narrow’ version of 
the Porter hypothesis - more stringent environmental regulation will increase 
environmental innovation - is instead well supported by the data. Jaffe and 
Palmer (1997) and Lanoie et al. (2011) estimate the relationship between total 
R&D expenditure and pollution abatement costs and find a positive 
correlation.  
 
In a recent paper, Albrizio et al (2014) look at the effect of environmental 
stringency policy changes on productivity growth in the OECD countries. 
They experiment a new environmental policy stringency (EPS) index, and test 
a reduced-form model of multi-factor productivity growth, that takes into 
account that the effect of environmental policy measures varies with industry 
pollution intensity and technological advancement. Their results suggest that 
“productivity growth is negatively affected by the policy change after a year. The 
negative announcement effect is offset three years after the realization of the policy 
change”.8  
 
 
III. Equation, data set and econometric strategy 
 
The Porter assumption has been empirically examined by evaluating two 
different degrees of stringency: the weak and the strong version of the Porter 
hypothesis (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997).9. In this paper we test the weak                                                         8 Albrizio et al (2014). 9 The weak version of the Porter Hypothesis implies that environmental regulation will lead to an increase in environmental innovation. The strong version of the Porter Hypothesis claims that the cost savings from the improved production processes are sufficiently large to increase 
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hypothesis assuming that certain types of environmental regulation, those 
designed to target the outcome rather than the design of the production 
processes, are more likely to increase innovation and improve the 
performance of a company.  
 
Our empirical strategy is twofold. First we test for the direct influence of 
environmental policies on productivity growth and on the accumulation of 
technological and innovation capital (ICT, R&D). Then we investigate 
whether those countries where the degree of environmental regulation and 
innovation intensity were relatively higher experienced faster productivity 
growth. 
 
To analyze this assumption we adopt a difference in difference approach as in 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) who proposed an estimation model with 
interactions to test the impact of financial development on industry growth. 
Their approach has been widely adopted in the finance and industry growth 
literature to analyze the effects of labor market institutions on comparative 
advantage and productivity (e.g. Cingano et al., 2010; Cuat and Melitz, 2010), 
to investigate the relation between human capital and comparative advantage 
(e.g. Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2010), and to examine the economic 
consequences of firm size, entry regulation, transaction costs, fiscal policy, 
risk sharing, and foreign aid (e.g.; Michelacci and Schivardi, 2010). 
 
We start from a standard production function augmented with environmental 
policy variables to check for the direct impact of environmental regulation on 
productivity growth: 
                                                                                                                                                               competitiveness. It rejects the assumption of perfect markets with profit maximizing firms and assumes instead that firms are not operating fully efficiently by leaving some profit opportunities unused. Environmental policies might hence induce the firm to rethink their production process.  
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ΔlnY = α1 + α2ΔlnX + α3Z1 + α4Z2 ε       (1) 
 
Where Y is an indicator of labor productivity (LP or MFP) X is a set of controls 
including measures of capital stock and Z1 is a measure of environmental 
regulation. If α3 is positive then our assumption (the Weak Version of the 
Porter Hypothesis WVPH holds) is supported. In other words, this would 
confirm that well designed environmental policies can positively affect 
productivity growth (e.g. there is a double dividend). Further, the TFP 
regression results allow checking for the presence of spillovers to 
environmental stringency measures. Z2 is a vector of control variables 
including output gap, real oil price, trade openness, government balance, FDI 
inflows and a time trend.10 
 
Then we investigate the correlation between a set of environmental stringency 
proxies and two measures of technological and innovation capital stock (i.e. 
ICT, R&D) in equation 2 below. The main hypothesis is that environmental 
regulation is likely to have a positive direct impact on the accumulation of 
technological and innovation capital. More stringent environmental 
regulation is assumed to foster ICT and R&D investments since they are key 
elements to reduce the environmental footprint of economic activities. If this 
assumption is empirically supported we can also make inference about the 
channels through which environmental stringency indirectly affects 
productivity growth.  
 
ΔlnKi = α1 + α2lnZ1 + α3Z2 ε        (2) 
 
If α2 is positive and significant we can take the results as an “indirect” test of 
WVPH.                                                          10 See table A2 in the appendix for a description of the variables. 
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As for environmental stringency indicators, it is relevant to notice that policy 
makers have the power of choosing between alternative policy instruments, 
and that their choice is strongly influenced by the degree of incentives to 
develop environmental friendly technologies. In particular, there are two 
main categories of policy instruments: i) market-based instruments providing 
incentives to the reduction or removal of negative environmental externalities 
and ii) command and control instruments that are more strict compared to 
market-based instruments (i.e. emission standards, process/equipment 
specifications, limits on input/output/discharges).11  
 
We initially evaluate the direct and indirect effect of the new Environmental 
Policy Stringency (EPS) index, developed for the OECD countries by Botta 
and Koźluk (2014), on productivity growth. The EPS is a composite indicator 
based on the aggregation of quantitative and qualitative information on 
selected environmental policy instruments into one comparable, country-
specific proxy of environmental policy stringency.12  
 
The EPS covers 24 OECD countries over the period 1990-2012, and it is 
particularly useful for our macroeconomic, cross country approach since it 
reduces a complex of multidimensional policies into a comparable country-
specific measure. 
                                                         11 The environmental economics literature has broadly discussed the incentives for the adoption and development of environment-friendly technologies provided by different policy instruments. The debate was in fact dominated by the opposition between command-and-control versus economic and market driven approach, the first being considered inferior compared to the second. See Malueg (1989) and Fisher et al. (2003) 12 The indicator is based on the taxonomy developed by De Serres et al. (2010) and the sub-components are all weighted equally. A market-based subcomponent groups instruments which assign an explicit price to the externalities (taxes: CO2, SOX, NOX, and diesel fuel; trading schemes: CO2, renewable energy certificates, energy efficiency certificates; feed in- tariffs; and deposit-refund-schemes), while the non-market component clusters command-and-control instruments, such as standards (emission limit values for NOX, SOX, and PM, limits on sulphur content in diesel), and technology-support policies, such as government R&D subsidies.  
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Chart 1. Environmental Policy Stringency Indicator (EPS) 
 
 Source: Albrizio 2014. 
 
Then we test four different measures of environmental regulation that can be 
considered “EU specific”. They include command and control (i and ii) and 
marked based provisions (iii)13: i) CO2 emissions in metric tons per capita as a 
difference with respect to the 2020 target,14 ii) the ratification of the Kyoto 
agreement and iii) the revenues from environmental taxes in percentage of 
GDP15 and iv) a dummy “2005” to catch the impact of the introduction of the 
European Emission Trading System (ETS).  
 
We included both types of environmental regulation since related literature 
supports the assumption that the impact of marked based and command and 
control policy instruments on innovation and productivity can differ. In                                                         13 In equation (2) we also included a measure of environmental patents measured as number of patent applications to the EPO taken from OECD. In an extensive survey, Griliches (1990, p. 1661) mentions the advantages of using patent statistics as indicators in this kind of analysis. 14 A 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels. 15 On the whole, most European countries have fairly high levels of environmental taxation – at least compared to the other OECD countries. 
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particular, command and control measures have been criticized for restricting 
technological progress since they do not provide any incentive to innovate.16 
Market-based and flexible instruments such as emission taxes or tradable 
allowances, or performance standards, are more favorable to innovation than 
technological standard since they leave more freedom to firms about the 
technological solution to minimize compliance costs. 
 
All in all, we expect a positive coefficient for the control variables and ICT 
and R&D capital stock. But we do not have any a priori about the expected 
sign of environmental variables in both equations. A positive sign of ETS, 
Kyoto agreement, environmental taxes and a negative coefficient for the 
variable representing the distance of the emission with respect to the EU 
target however would support the WVPH hypothesis. 
 
Finally, we tested equation 3 including some interaction terms to evaluate the 
differential impacts of different environmental stringency measures on 
productivity and innovation:  
 
ΔlnY = α1 + α2ΔlnX + α3lnKI*Z1 + ε       (3) 
 
If α3 is positive then countries with tighter environmental regulation and 
higher innovation intensity experience faster productivity growth. It is worth 
to notice that all the environmental stringency measures are mainly related to 
emission reduction and for this reason might have had a strong impact on a 
broad range of production techniques and competitive advantages also at the 
aggregate level. Thus they are particularly suitable for our purposes. 
 
                                                        16 Swaney (1992), Fischer, Parry and Pizer (2003), Jaffe and Palmer (1997). 
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Our analysis covers 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, UK, plus USA as a 
control country) over the period 1995-2008.17 Annual data are from OECD and 
EUKLEMS (see for descriptive statistics table 5). As for the empirical strategy, 
we use a panel data technique. A major motivation for this choice is the 
possibility to control for the correlated time invariant heterogeneity. We 
perform a Hausman specification test to check the presence of correlation 
between explanatory variables and individual effects.  
 
Equation (1) can be affected by endogeneity and we control measurement 
errors by means of instrumental variables. 
 
 
IV. Estimation results: is there a double dividend? 
 
Table 118 shows the estimation results for equation (1) a production function 
augmented with environmental policy variables to check for the direct impact 
of environmental regulation on productivity growth. We run fixed effects 
(columns 1 and 2) and instrumental variables regressions (columns 3 and 4). 
Coherently with the empirical production function literature,19 ICT and NON 
ICT capital coefficients are positive and statistically significant. As for the EPS 
index, in line with Albrizio 2014, we find a positive and significant coefficient 
and the results in columns 2 and 4 suggest that the positive relationship 
between labor productivity and environmental policy stringency is mainly                                                         17 The choice of the time span is due to homogeneous data availability furthermore we decided to exclude from the analysis the period of the sovereign and financial crisis that somehow could bias the results. 18 In Table 2 labor productivity and EPS and table 5 MFP and EPS and EU provisions refer to equation 1, table 2 ICT, R&D and EPS and table 4 ICT, R&D and “European” environmental provisions refers to equation 2 and table 3 labor productivity and “European” environmental provisions refers to equation 2 and 3,  19 See Biagi, (2013) for a survey of the empirical literature on ICT and productivity. 
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driven by the market based component of the composite indicator (eps_mb) 
(see Chart 2). Policy stringency indicators are lagged since the productivity 
effects of policy changes might be lagged in time.  
 
The findings in Table 1 suggest that the WVPH cannot be rejected (α3 is 
positive and significant) and that a deeper investigation of this hypothesis is 
warranted. Thus we turn to the analysis of the influence of environmental 
regulation, as measured by the OECD composite indicators, on ICT capital 
accumulation and R&D expenditure to investigate for the presence of an 
indirect channel trough which environmental stringency might affect 
productivity growth (cfr equation 2). 
 
 
Chart 2. EPS vs. labour productivity growth: 1995-2008 
 Source: OECD 
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Table 1. Labour productivity and EPS     (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES FE IV           DlnH_k_nonict_klems 0.426*** 0.431*** 0.528*** 0.532***   (0.0840) (0.0838) (0.106) (0.100) DlnH_k_ict_klems 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.0830** 0.0717**   (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0323) (0.0320) L.eps_fs 0.00754***  0.00805***     (0.00272)  (0.00237)   Trend 0.00119* 0.00108 -9.27e-06 -0.000249   (0.000716) (0.000719) (0.000609) (0.000618) L.outputgap -0.00410*** -0.00388*** -0.00506*** -0.00466***   (0.000792) (0.000808) (0.000699) (0.000741) L.eps_mb   0.00565***  0.00623***     (0.00197)  (0.00166) L.eps_nmb   0.00196  0.00199     (0.00194)  (0.00166) L.realoilp -0.000145* -0.000147*      (0.000716) (0.000018)    Constant -0.0389* -0.0342* -0.00525 0.00327   (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0187) (0.0191)         Observations 132 132 121 121 R-squared 0.423 0.431 0.640 0.647  1.89 (0.08) 12.7 (0.05)     Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table 2 confirms previous results (α2 is positive and significant) showing that 
“marked based” environmental stringency measures (eps_mb) positively 
affect ICT capital accumulation and R&D expenditure. Interestingly, 
command and control (eps_nmb) environmental measures have a significant 
negative impact on R&D. One possible explanation is that there is a 
mechanism at work for which the costs of complying with environmental 
provision on average offset R&D expenditure. 
 
However this result deserves careful consideration since our specification 
might not capture all relevant market interactions. 
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Table 2. ICT, R&D and EPS FE (1) (2)  ICT R&D eps_mb 0.014** 0.006**  (0.006) (0.003) eps_nmb -0.006 -0.008***  (0.006) (0.003) realoilp -0.0004* -0.0004***  (0.0002) (0.0001) outputgap 0.013*** -0.001  (0.002) (0.001) trend -0.007*** 0.003***  (0.002) (0.001) Constant 0.334*** -0.032  (0.053) (0.028) Observations 132      144 R-squared 0.433     0.223 Number of ctrycode 11    12 Hausman test F2)                  4.08 (0.54)                                           141.3 (0.00) 
 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In what follows, we look at the direct and indirect impact of individual 
environmental “European” provisions on growth. The sole provisions 
positively and significantly affecting labor productivity are marked based: 
environmental taxes (envtaxes) and the introduction of the ETS in 2005. 
Particularly the coefficient of the environmental taxes is the highest. 
Command and control indicators (i.e. Kyoto and Emission targets) are in most 
cases not statistically significant (see Table 3). 
 
The inclusion of an interaction term between the policy indicators and capital 
stocks provides additional insights to the analysis (cfr equation 3). With the 
inclusion of these terms, the estimated coefficients indicate the difference in 
effects of the variable (ICT) on the dependent variable (Labour productivity) 
after and before the introduction of the ETS. 
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The synergy between ETS and ICT is positive and statistically significant (α3 is 
positive and significant) corroborating the assumption that those countries 
that are relatively more ICT intensive had higher productivity returns from 
the introduction of the ETS. Interestingly also the interaction between ICT and 
Kyoto is positive and significant. Being more ICT intensive mitigates (by the 
amount of the estimated coefficient) the negative impact of the Kyoto 
agreement on productivity. 
 
The positive effect of EU environmental measures is robust also when we look 
at ICT capital accumulation (Table 4 cfr equation 2), in particular we find that 
the ratification of the Kyoto agreement had a negative and significant 
influence while the emission target had a positive and significant impact. As 
for R&D both Kyoto and ETS had a negative and significant impact showing 
once again that the impact of environmental policies on R&D is somehow 
difficult to catch at least at aggregate level. 
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Table 3. Labor productivity and “European” environmental provisions   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV
DlnH_k_nonict_klems 0.495*** 0.543*** 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.424*** 0.415*** 0.509*** 0.508*** 0.456*** 0.407***
(0.0872) (0.107) (0.0844) (0.0992) (0.0837) (0.108) (0.0933) (0.115) (0.0822) (0.106)
DlnH_k_ict_klems 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.262*** 0.131*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.127*** 0.142***
(0.0322) (0.0304) (0.0693) (0.0490) (0.0361) (0.0405) (0.0361) (0.0393) (0.0321) (0.0322)
L.ets 0.00751** 0.0126*** 0.00629* 0.0116***
(0.00377) (0.00364) (0.00363) (0.00359)
L.tgemiss 0.000191 -0.000851 -0.00154 -0.000749
(0.00170) (0.00164) (0.00232) (0.00188)
L.envtaxes 0.0133** 0.0125** 0.0179*** 0.0153***
(0.00549) (0.00504) (0.00562) (0.00525)
L.kyoto -0.00200 -0.00260 -0.0122* -0.00896
(0.00433) (0.00338) (0.00664) (0.00585)
L.outputgap -0.00421*** -0.00464*** -0.00378*** -0.00406*** -0.00496*** -0.00505*** -0.00481*** -0.00478*** -0.00480*** -0.00460***
(0.000967) (0.000815) (0.000796) (0.000710) (0.000910) (0.000772) (0.000879) (0.000766) (0.000967) (0.000882)
L.tradeopen -0.000525** -0.000704*** -0.000674*** -0.000650*** -0.000274 -0.000436* -0.000379 -0.000503** -0.000325 -0.000443**
(0.000239) (0.000226) (0.000235) (0.000205) (0.000242) (0.000237) (0.000241) (0.000220) (0.000219) (0.000224)
trend 0.00196** 0.00200*** 0.00195*** 0.00134*** 0.00186*** 0.00222*** 0.00131* 0.00162** 0.00282** 0.000654
(0.000760) (0.000694) (0.000521) (0.000497) (0.000600) (0.000526) (0.000739) (0.000798) (0.00135) (0.00131)
Dict_envtaxes -0.0522** -0.0199
(0.0211) (0.0157)
L.Dict_envtaxes
L.Dict_tgemiss 0.00645 0.00846
(0.0135) (0.01000)
ets -0.00136 -0.000129
(0.00409) (0.00355)
L.Dict_ets 0.0946** 0.0933**
(0.0458) (0.0394)
L.lnH_k_ict_klems -0.00451 0.00958
(0.00875) (0.00895)
L.ict_kyoto 0.00427** 0.00519***
(0.00187) (0.00192)
Constant -0.0618** -0.0224 -0.0648*** -0.0138 -0.0341* -0.0252 -0.0105 0.00173 -0.0555* 0.00918
(0.0250) (0.0248) (0.0197) (0.0205) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0254) (0.0247) (0.0292) (0.0318)
Observations 132 121 132 121 121 121 121 121 132 121
R-squared 0.429 0.648 0.457 1 0.414 0.622 0.436 0.635 0.413 0.640
Hausman test ( 2)                         10.52 (0.31)    13.4 (0.00)                      10.52 (0.31) 6.78 (0.56) 3.88 (0.87)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ICT and Env Taxes ICT and Emissions ICT and ETS ICT and KyotoNo iteractions
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Table 4. ICT, R&D and “European” environmental provisions   (1) (2) FE ICT R&D L.tgemiss 0.010* 0.003  (0.005) (0.003) L.envtaxes 0.031** 0.004  (0.015) (0.009) L.kyoto -0.040*** -0.012**  (0.011) (0.006) ets 0.023** -0.014***  (0.010) (0.005) L.tradeopen 0.001 -0.001*  (0.001) (0.0003) trend -0.004** 0.003***  (0.002) (0.001) Constant 0.082 -0.018  (0.063) (0.034) Observations 132 144 R-squared 0.418 0.161 Number of ctrycode 11 12 Hausman test (F2)                      4.12 (0.66)               2.71 (0.85) Standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Finally we investigate the relationship between a measure of Total Factor 
Productivity growth and our environmental policy indicators (cfr equation 1).  
 
According to our estimates, multifactor productivity is positively and 
significantly affected by EPS, probably because of the positive influence of 
market based policy measures on growth (table 5). The introduction of the 
European trading system has a positive impact on productivity too. This 
result supports the idea that the introduction of a “cap and trade” provision is 
an effective incentive to the country to reduce pollution thus stimulating 
innovation. 
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Table 5. MFP and EPS and EU provisions FE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)        eps_fs 0.383**       (0.179)      outputgap 0.0974**  0.104**  0.143**   (0.0456)  (0.0476)  (0.0596)  Trend -0.112*** -0.0593* -0.113*** -0.0630* -0.135*** 0.0278  (0.0349) (0.0317) (0.0352) (0.0320) (0.0495) (0.0459) L.eps_fs  0.409**       (0.164)     L.outputgap  -0.0971*  -0.0896*  -0.138**   (0.0519)  (0.0528)  (0.0592) eps_mb   0.241*       (0.132)    eps_nmb   0.145       (0.127)    L.eps_mb    0.284**       (0.126)   L.eps_nmb    0.134       (0.119)   Ets     0.129       (0.227)  tgemiss     -0.0675       (0.111)  envtaxes     0.283       (0.397)  Kyoto     0.542*       (0.303)  tradeopen     0.00160       (0.0151)  L.ets      0.736***       (0.218) L.tgemiss      0.0976       (0.113) L.envtaxes      0.732**       (0.317) L.kyoto      -0.228       (0.270) L.tradeopen      -0.0235       (0.0145) Constant 2.878*** 1.249 2.954*** 1.393* 3.304* -1.344  (0.858) (0.817) (0.874) (0.837) (1.690) (1.423)        Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 R-squared 0.093 0.111 0.095 0.116 0.093 0.184 Number of ctrycode 12 12 12 12 12 12        Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusion    
In this paper we explore the relationship between environmental policy 
stringency, productivity and innovation for a panel of EU countries over the 
period 1995-2008. We test for the effect of several measures of environmental 
policy stringency on productivity and its components.  
 
Our findings support the assumption that restrictive environmental policies 
did not erode the competitiveness in the EU member economies but instead 
had a growth-promoting effect. Market based provisions (i.e. ETS, 
environmental taxes), in particular, had a positive impact on productivity 
growth via their influence on ICT capital accumulation. Environmental taxes 
had the largest impact on labour productivity and ICT capital accumulation. 
  
On the other hand, command and control policy measures did not appear to 
have a statistically significant impact on the countries’ growth performances. 
The ratification of the Kyoto agreement is the sole exception negatively 
affecting ICT capital accumulation and R&D expenditure. However, the 
interaction between ICT and Kyoto is positive and significant supporting the 
idea that the negative impact on productivity determined by the Kyoto 
agreement is mitigated by the ICT intensity. 
 
Country-level analysis allowed us to capture the variation both across policies 
and across outcomes, as well as possible spillover effects. Compared to 
industry or firm level studies, which suffer from the lack of generality as they 
usually provide very context-specific conclusions, a country-level approach is 
best suited for international policy-making. 
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Our analysis corroborates the assumption that the gradual strategic 
reorientation of environmental policies in the EU in favor of economic 
incentives in the period under examination has been more effective in 
stimulating productivity and innovation than setting explicit directives about 
pollution control levels or methods. This evidence supports the conjecture 
that the stringency of environmental policies can be increased without 
harming economy-wide productivity and that a deeper analysis of the 
mechanisms through which environmental policy influenced productivity 
and innovativeness has potentially relevant implication to develop further the 
European environmental policy agenda. Consistently with the strategic 
reorientation of environmental policies in the European Union since the end 
of the 1980s, our results indicate that the EU might privilege the market based 
instruments in order to meet more effectively the 2030 targets especially 
through the channels of innovation and productivity enhancement. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Overview of empirical studies at macro level 
Auth., 
year 
Dep. Var. Indep. Var. Sample Methodology Result Lanjouw and Mody (1996) 
Patent counts PACE US, Japanese and German economies, 1971 – 1988  
evaluate effect of pollution abatement capital expenditure on patent count with simple time series correlation 
positive effect on patent count, but lagged by 1-2 years 
• evidence is found that foreign regulations also influence domestic patent count Jeon and Sickles (2004) ΔEfficiency score derived from DEA 
CO2 emissions 17 OECD and 11 Asian economies, 1980 – 1995  
compares efficiency scores of three scenarios (free emission, no change of emission levels, partial reduction of emissions) 
adjusted TFP growth is lower than traditional for OECD countries whereas it is higher for ASEAN countries productivity growth is lower in constant emission scenario then in free emissions scenario for OECD and ASEAN economies productivity growth is higher in scenario of emission reduction in OECD and ASEAN economies De Vries and Withagen (2005) 
Environmental patents Dummy variable for regulations 14 OECD economies, 1970 – 2000 instrumental variable approach fixed effect estimation 
large positive effect on patent count 
Yörük and Zaim (2005) Δ Efficiency score derived from DEA (CO2, NOX and water pollutants) 
UNFCCC protocol ratification OECD economies, 1983- 1998 compares traditional with adjusted productivity index (emission reduction scenario)  fixed effect regression of dummy marking years of UNFCCC ratification on adjusted productivity growth 
adjusted productivity growth is significantly larger than traditional effect of NOX and water pollutants is largest significant positive effect of UNFCCC ratification non adjusted MFP growth (no effect on traditional MFP growth) Popp (2006) Environmental patents SOX and NOX Regulations US, Japanese and German economies, 1967 – 2003  
evaluates effect of domestic and foreign regulation on innovation with simple time-series correlation 
inventors respond to environmental regulation pressure in their own country but not to foreign environmental regulation Johnstone et al. 2010° Patent counts in renewable Renewable energy policy 25 OECD countries, 1978 – panel estimated with a negative binomial model, renewable energy policies have a significant effect on 
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energy sectors variables 2003 fixed effects are included, 3 of 6 policy variables are modelled with dummies (introduced or not 
related patents, feed-in-tariffs have an additional positive effect on solar power patents, renewable energy certificates have a positive effect on wind energy patents. Johnstone et al. 2010b Environmental patent counts Perceptions of environmental policy stringency, flexibility and predictability (WEF survey) 
OECD countries, 2000 – 2007  panel estimated with a negative binomial model, due to high collinearity of the policy variables, orthogonal factors are extracted, included 
policy stringency, flexibility and stability have a positive coefficient (weak PH). 
Albrizio et al (2014)  MFP new environmental policy stringency (EPS) index, 
19 OECD countries 1990-2012 panel fixed effect estimation On average, there is a positive effect of a tightening of environmental policy on MFP growth. The effect is more significant when controlling for covariates. 
 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics Variable Obs Mean    Std. Dev. Min Max lnLP 192 3.791522    .8746021 2.783899 5.882199 lnnonICTK 143 4.20087    .9831938 2.869709 6.299414 lnICTK 143 2.025613    1.125143 0.3929425 5.184725 lnR&D 192 1.398369     1.25344 -0.7112087 4.436729 outputgap 306 .1046405     2.33713 -7.97 6.98 realoilp 372 -135.9265    1051.201 -5877.109 152.3371 eps_mb 252 1.507887     1.04151 0.125 4.1 eps_nmb 250 2.25     1.13541 0.75 5.5 eps_fs 250 1.88385    .9680698 0.5 4.675 envtaxes 204 2.820098    .9258935 0.8 5.2 envpatent 312 110.5359    146.7683 1 586.8 ets 492 .1341463    .3411564 0 1 tgemiss 251 1.915321    1.113396 -0.35757 5.293368 kyoto 492 .2012195    .4013198 0 1    
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Table A3. Data description Variable Description Source Labour productivity Real value added per hours worked EUKLEMS NON-ICT Real capital stock EUKLEMS ICT Real capital stock EUKLEMS R&D Expenditure data BERD Eurostat ets Time dummy “2005” to catch the impact of the introduction of the European Emission Trading System   EU  envtaxes 
 
The revenues from environmental taxes in percentage of GDP OECD kyoto Ratification of the Kyoto agreement UNFCC tgemiss  CO2 emissions in metric tons per capita as a difference with respect to the 2020 target OECD envpatent  Number of environmental patent applications to the EPO OECD Output gap % deviation of GDP from its trend. Source: OECD Fiscal balance/GDP Tax revenue minus any government spending. Source: WDI World Bank Real oil price in US$ Price of oil in US dollars. Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream Trade openness Export +Import/2 in US dollars current prices Source: OECD 
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